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THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE DEBATE AFTER 
CITIZENS UNITED 
Michael S. Kang 
Citizens United1 is the most important campaign finance decision 
of the last thirty years and the fitting subject of this symposium, An 
Intersection of Laws: Citizens United v. FEC, hosted by Georgia 
State University College of Law. Indeed, no decision has received 
such intense public attention in election law since Bush v. Gore. No 
surprise, then, that this symposium attracted such an esteemed group 
of scholars and practitioners with a diversity of views about the 
decision and its implications. It was an honor to participate, and my 
assignment is to identify themes and ways forward across these many 
reactions.  
First, a quick description of the decision itself. Citizens United held 
that prohibitions on corporate electioneering in federal elections are 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.2 Prohibitions on 
corporate expenditures had been a pillar of federal campaign finance 
law for at least sixty years,3 while broader prohibitions on corporate 
electioneering communications, as defined by the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act,4 were newer but recently upheld in 
McConnell v. FEC less than seven years ago.5 These prohibitions 
violated the First Amendment, according to Citizens United, because 
they imposed government “restrictions on certain disfavored 
speakers,” namely corporations.6    
This differential regulation of corporations could not be justified, 
the Court explained, because the only government interest in 
regulating campaign finance is the prevention of actual or apparent 
corruption. The Court expressly overruled precedent supporting 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n , 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).  
 2. Id. at 913. 
 3. Id. at 953 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the historical pedigree of corporate restrictions in 
campaign finance, including the prohibition on corporate expenditures in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947).  
 4. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)–(3) (2006).  
 5. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003). 
 6. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899. 
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application of this corruption interest to a distinct worry about 
corporate wealth. Electioneering by corporations could be not be 
restricted based on the notion that their treasury wealth posed the 
potential to “distort” the political process through spending 
disproportionate to the public’s support for the corporations’ ideas.7 
As a result, a prohibition on independent expenditures and 
electioneering communications by corporations could not be 
sustained under the First Amendment. Independent electioneering as 
a categorical matter, whether by individuals or corporations, simply 
“do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”8 
Gene Nichol and Joel Gora look back to this central reasoning in 
Citizens United and disagree violently about its merits. These 
opposed contributions of my colleagues to this symposium revisit the 
classic debate in campaign finance reform between critical 
democratic values of equality and liberty. Nichol and Gora take 
polarized positions on Citizens United with personal conviction that 
is rare in drier, less politically salient areas of law, but not unusual for 
the subject of campaign finance reform.  
On one hand, Gene Nichol criticizes the decision and argues that 
“Citizens United renders all campaign finance limitation silly and 
ridiculous.”9 For Nichol, campaign finance limitations serve an 
important democratic purpose in limiting the transfer of economic 
advantage into advantages in political influence. Campaign finance 
limitations such as the prohibition on corporate electioneering restrict 
the ability of the wealthy to exert disproportionate power in the 
political sphere by dominating democratic discourse and drowning 
out other voices. Nichol therefore sees Citizens United as threatening 
to the important democratic value of equality and attempts, through 
campaign finance, to guard against the use of “wealth to dominate the 
operation of the political process.”10   
                                                                                                                 
 7. Id. at 905–08 overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).  
 8. Id. at 909.  
 9. Gene Nichol, Citizens United and the Roberts Court’s War on Democracy, 27 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 1007 (2011).  
 10. Id. at 1013.  
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On the other hand, Joel Gora praises Citizens United as a simple 
case upholding the core First Amendment value of free speech. Gora 
argues that eliminating restrictions on campaign finance serves not 
only this basic liberty but also serves equality by freeing everyone 
equally of restrictions on speech. Of course, the quick response in the 
symposium came from Steven Winter on the ground that the 
elimination of campaign finance restrictions might in theory free 
everyone to spend more on political speech, but in practice the ability 
to spend more on political speech helps only those with the resources 
to do so.11 In a world where financial resources are distributed 
unevenly, the elimination of restrictions on campaign finance helps 
everyone in theory, but only the relatively rich in practice—which is 
why Nichol criticizes Citizens United as “secur[ing] a power for 
people of wealth to use their disproportionate economic resources to 
get their way in our politics.”12   
The heart of Gora’s support for Citizens United is grounded in a 
call for First Amendment liberty. Gora argues that Citizens United is 
“a landmark of political freedom.”13 The essence of the decision, in 
Gora’s view, is that the “First Amendment protects all those 
individuals and groups that would exercise their right to speak and 
communicate by disabling the government from abridging the 
freedom of speech.”14 This view too is grounded in structural benefits 
for democracy. Gora explains that political speech is essential to an 
effective democracy, and the democratic discourse benefits more 
from unrestrained production of as much political speech as the 
market can bear, than from government-imposed equality of voice.  
This disagreement between Nichol and Gora about Citizens United 
reflects a basic value conflict underlying campaign finance law since 
Buckley v. Valeo. As Kathleen Sullivan once put it, “Buckley 
involved nothing less than a choice between two of our most 
powerful traditions: equality in the realm of democratic polity, and 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Steven L. Winter, Citizens Disunited, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1133 (2011).  
    12.   Nichol, supra note 9, at 1016. 
 13. Joel Gora, The First Amendment . . . United, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 935 (2011).  
 14. Id.  
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liberty in the realm of political speech.”15 Nichol and Gora are both 
right in some important measure about the importance of equality and 
liberty in a healthy democracy, but the question in campaign finance 
law has always been how to strike the right balance between the two 
values.  
Richard Briffault argues, in his contribution to the symposium, that 
the Court’s attempts to balance equality and liberty on a 
constitutional basis have been a disaster. The Court’s management of 
campaign finance law has produced a “combination of instability, 
internal inconsistency, and practical unworkability.”16 On this point, 
everyone agrees completely with each other, and with Briffault.17 
The Court’s three decades of work with campaign finance law have 
produced little more than a mess.18 Campaign finance law is an 
unsatisfying, unworkable tangle that enormously complicates the 
practice of politics and makes innovative reform in campaign finance 
almost impossible. Reviewing this dismal state of the law, Briffault 
calls for the “dejudicialization” of campaign finance law, with courts 
deferring to democratic resolution of the proper balance between 
equality and liberty in campaign finance law.19   
Citizens United, of course, is a gigantic step further away from any 
dejudicialization of campaign finance law. The Rehnquist Court 
generally deferred to the government in campaign finance cases for 
two decades, culminating in the McConnell v. FEC decision 
upholding BCRA in 2003.20 The Roberts Court since has charted a 
very different path in which Citizens United was the most recent and 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 667 
(1997).  
 16. Richard Briffault, On Dejudicializing American Campaign Finance Law, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
887 (2011).  
 17. See, e.g., Nichol, supra note 9, at 1010 (“Campaign finance law is lousy.”); Gora, supra note 12, 
at 980 (“[T]he campaign finance regime we have been living under for the last forty years, with its 
byzantine rules and regulations and IRS-like complexity, its stratification of speech rights in tax code 
like categories, and provisions and exceptions and exceptions to the exceptions and safe harbors . . . 
should be on any Top Ten list of incoherent systems.”).  
 18. See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
893, 893 (1998) (“Seldom have so many worked so hard and so long to accomplish so little.”).  
 19. Briffault, supra note 16.  
 20. See Richard L. Hasen, Buckley Is Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance 
Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31 (2004).  
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dramatic step. Along these lines, Rick Hasen criticizes the rejection 
in Citizens United of equality interests, in the form of the 
antidistortion rationale, in campaign finance law.21 In Hasen’s view, 
“political equality is a key state interest to be balanced against First 
Amendment rights,” but Citizens United now leaves no room for 
legislative recognition of that value in campaign finance law.22 The 
decision closes off so much of the government interest in regulation 
that legislatures will have a difficult time justifying as a constitutional 
matter much new regulation beyond basic disclosure and contribution 
limits on candidates and parties.23   
As a result, the best opportunities for campaign finance reform 
may come, ironically, from outside campaign finance regulation. 
Ciara Torres-Spelliscy argued during the symposium for reform of 
corporate law to require greater shareholder control over corporate 
electioneering. Measures such as the Shareholder Protection Act 
would require shareholder approval in advance of certain corporate 
electioneering, as well as mandate regular disclosures of corporate 
electioneering expenses. Larry Ribstein responded that such 
legislative efforts to regulate corporate speech through corporate law 
should encounter First Amendment challenges, even if structured as 
corporate governance measures instead of traditional campaign 
finance regulation.24 Ribstein’s concerns are probably well taken to 
the degree that these corporate reforms are isolated to electioneering 
restrictions, but less prominent for reforms that are more broadly 
based guarantees of shareholder approval that check management 
discretion beyond just such electioneering.  
It is surprising, in any event, that Torres-Spelliscy and Ribstein 
agree that greater shareholder input on corporate political activity is 
likely to restrain corporate electioneering. Torres-Spelliscy and 
Ribstein predict that measures like the Shareholder Protection Act 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 27 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 989 (2011).  
 22. Id. at 1002.  
 23. See Michael S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243, 245–46 (2010).  
 24. Larry E. Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1019 
(2011).  
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would effectively limit corporate electioneering, though they disagree 
whether that is likely to be a good result.25 The bulk of the corporate 
scholarship, though, finds as a general matter that management tends 
to get its way in shareholder voting.26 One might suspect the same 
empirical pattern would hold true for shareholder votes on corporate 
electioneering as well, though it would depend a great deal on the 
details of the reform.  
What then for campaign finance reform? Heather Gerken, in her 
keynote address for the symposium, argues that lobbying reform is 
the next best step for the regulation of money in the political process. 
This move builds on an interesting intuition. Campaign finance and 
lobbying are natural counterparts, with campaign finance spending 
typically serving as a lever for access to lobby its beneficiaries once 
in office.27 As Citizens United closes off campaign finance law to 
reform, perhaps the best alternative is to regulate any implicit quid 
pro quo on the back end by regulating lobbying ex post.28     
The practical obstacles to lobbying regulation, though, appear as 
daunting as those for campaign finance reform. The First Amendment 
offers a textual basis for protection of the right to petition 
government29 that is at least as strong as that for campaign spending 
on elections. It is not clear at all that the Court would construe the 
First Amendment as vigorously in defense of lobbying as it has for 
campaign finance, but the textual hook is at least as sure. For this 
reason, lobbying regulation has generally been restricted to disclosure 
of lobbying activity, with limited exceptions.30 What is more, more 
aggressive regulation of lobbying such as expenditure limitations are 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Anne Tucker, in her symposium contribution, argues that such restraint would be a good thing, 
because it would preempt a prisoner’s dilemma among corporations to accelerate spending in 
competition with one another. Anne Tucker, Rational Coercion: Citizens United and a Modern Day 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1105 (2011).  
 26. See, e.g., Yair J. Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones, 10 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
159 (2008).  
 27. See Richard Briffault, Lobbying and Campaign Finance: Separate and Together, 19 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 105 (2008); Elisabeth Bassett, Comment, Reform Through Exposure, 57 EMORY L.J. 1050 
(2008).  
 28. See Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).  
 29. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954).  
 30. See Briffault, supra note 27, at 110. 
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likely to run into definitional problems in legally identifying the basic 
regulated activity of lobbying. Much lobbying operates on a social 
and informal basis that makes any formal definition of lobbying 
almost certainly underinclusive and prone to strategic avoidance.31  
In other words, the basic constitutional and regulatory challenges of 
campaign finance reform apply with similar force to lobbying reform 
as well.  
Citizens United therefore leaves no promising avenue to reform for 
those concerned about the influence of money in politics. The 
decision, I think, closes off further campaign finance regulation to a 
substantial degree. Indeed, even basic campaign finance disclosure is 
being challenged and might eventually go the way of corporate 
source prohibitions if critics of campaign finance regulation get their 
way with the Roberts Court.32 Citizens United is not only a turning 
point in campaign finance law, but a turning point away from 
campaign finance regulation. For those concerned about money in 
politics, the right move now is to look outside campaign finance 
regulation, whether it is to corporate law or ex post regulation such as 
lobbying reform or even legislative recusal.33 Even so, those avenues 
appear to me equally complicated and difficult; there is no easy way 
after Citizens United.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 31. See generally Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L. 
REV. 131 (2005) (explaining how legal definitions addressing political activity are prone to avoidance by 
sophisticated political actors).  
 32. See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Has the Tide Turned in Favor of Disclosure? Revealing Money in 
Politics After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1057 (2011); Anthony Johnstone, 
A Madisonian Case for Campaign Finance Disclosure, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2012).  
 33. See Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 217, 
231–33 (2010); John Copeland Nagle, The Recusal Alternative to Campaign Finance Legislation, 37 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 69, 81–103 (2000).  
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